Jastrow: דִּיעֲבַך

דִּיעֲבַך m. (= דְּאִיעֲבַד, Dithpe. of עֲבַד) having been done, diăbad, a dialectical term to indicate that the case before you is dealt with as a fact, and not with reference to its direct permissibility in the premises, לכתחילה; as a fact, decision ex post facto. Ḥull. 2ᵃ הכל שוחטין לכתחילה ושחיטתן כשרה ד׳ the words of the Mishnah (I, 1), ‘All slaughter’ mean a direct permission (all may &c.), whereas the immediately following clause, ‘And their slaughtering is ritually legitimate’ indicates a decision after the fact (which implies that deaf-mute persons &c. must not be admitted to the slaughtering act)!—Ib.ᵇ איכא הכל לכ׳ איכא הכל ד׳ sometimes ‘All …’ means a direct permission (all may), and sometimes a sanction after the fact. Ib. תרתי ד׳ למה לי why should there be in the Mishnah two diabads? Men. 105ᵇ ד׳ אין לכ׳ לא if it has been done, it is legitimate, but directly permissible it is not. Ber. 15ᵃ; a. v. fr.—בְּדִ׳ as a diabad. Ḥull. 15ᵇ לא קא מכשיר … אלא בד׳ R. Ḥ. declares the action legitimate after it has been done, but he does not directly authorize it; a. fr. [Zeb. 75ᵇ דאיעבד, read: דאיערב.]